Glass-Steagall and Collective Investment Trusts for Individual
Retirement Accounts: Fiduciary Purpose or Investment? by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 42 | Issue 3 Article 9
Summer 6-1-1985
Glass-Steagall and Collective Investment Trusts for
Individual Retirement Accounts: Fiduciary
Purpose or Investment?
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Glass-Steagall and Collective Investment Trusts for Individual Retirement Accounts: Fiduciary Purpose or
Investment?, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 961 (1985), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/
vol42/iss3/9
GLASS-STEAGALL AND COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT
TRUSTS FOR INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS:
FIDUCIARY PURPOSE OR INVESTMENT?
Congress enacted the Banking Act of 1933' partially as a result of
numerous bank failures before and during the Depression.2 The Banking
Act, popularly known as the Glass-Steagall Act,' basically attempts to
separate commercial banking activities from investment banking activities.
4
1. Banking Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C. (1982)). The Banking Act stated as its purpose the facilitation of efficient and
safe use of assets by providing interbank control and preventing diversion of funds into
speculative operations. Id. The Act included introduction of deposit insurance, strenghthening
of the Federal Reserve System, expanded branch banking and a substantial separation of
commercial and investment banking. Id. §§ 3, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23 & 32; see M. Lowy, C.
MUCKENFUSS & B. NICHOLS, THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT: BANKS AND THE SECURITY BUSINESS 17
(1984) (discussion of Glass-Steagall Act) [hereinafter cited as Lowy]. The Act divided the
separation of commercial and investment banking into four sections popularly known as the
Glass-Steagall Act. See Banking Act, ch. 89, §§ 16, 20, 21 & 32, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (1982)); infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text
(discussion of §§ 16, 20, 21 and 32 of Glass-Steagall Act).
2. See Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88
BANK L.J. 483, 496-98 (1971) (failure of Bank of United States and other banks helped lead to
Glass-Steagall Act); see also S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 2, 5-6 (1933) (bank failures
contributed to passage of Glass-Steagall). During the years 1921 through 1929 approximately
5,500 banks failed leading to the collapse of the Bank of the United States in 1930. Lowy,
supra note 1, at 22. In 1931, approximately 2,290 bank failures occurred. Id. at 26. Senator
Glass introduced several banking bills into the Senate between 1931 and 1933 until he achieved
the passage of Senate Bill 1631 in May, 1933. Id. at 31. The House of Representatives also
passed the Steagall insurance bill in May, 1933. Id. After House-Senate conference, both houses
adopted the bill on June 13, 1933 and signed the bill on June 16, 1933. Id.
Congress made several assumptions about the significance to banking of the many bank
failures. See S. REP. No. 77, supra, at 3-7. Congress believed that widespread bank failure
resulted from unsound banking conditions. Id. at 6; see Ianni, "Security" Under The Glass-
Steagall Act And The Federal Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934: The Direction of The Supreme
Court's Analysis, 100 BANK L.J. 100, 104 (1983) (discussion of Congressional assumptions
following Panic of 1929). Additionally, many Congressmen believed that proper banking activity
included productive commercial loans as opposed to speculative investments. See S. REP. No.
77, supra, at 6 (banks do not belong in speculative activities); Ianni, supra, at 104 (banks should
allocate capital through commercial loans). Finally, Congress adamantly believed that sound
banking practices required public confidence. See H. R. REP. No. 150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-
7 (1933) (need exists to restore public confidence in the banking system); lanni, supra, at 104
(public confidence essential to bank's success).
3. See supra notes 1-2 (portion of Banking Act is popularly known as Glass-Steagall Act
after Senator Glass and Representative Steagall); see also ch. 89, §§ 16, 20, 21 & 32, 48 Stat.
162 (1933) (text of Glass-Steagall Act).
4. See Banking Act, ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§24 (Seventh) (1982)) (prohibition against banks engaging in securities activities); id. § 21
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982)) (prohibition against investment banks engaging
in deposit taking); id. § 20 (codified as amended as 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1982)) (prohibition against
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During the years since Congress passed Glass-Steagall, federal courts have
examined bank activities such as third-party commercial paper, 5 collective
investment managing agency funds,6 discount brokerage subsidiaries 7 and
investment advisory services8 to determine whether banks have violated the
Glass-Steagall Act by dealing in securities. 9
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA),10 which authorized commercial banks to offer individual retirement
accounts (IRAs)." Currently, several large national banks have attempted to
affiliation between bank and investment company); id. § 32 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 78 (1982)) (prohibition against interlocking directorates between banks and investment
companies), infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text (discussion of §§ 16, 20, 21 and 32 of
Glass-Steagall Act); see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971) (no dispute
that Glass-Steagall intended to separate commercial and investment banking); Investment Co.
Inst. v. Conover, 596 F. Supp. 1496, 1501-02 (D.D.C. 1984) (Conover II) (Glass-Steagall Act
separates commercial and investment banking); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 593 F. Supp.
846, 850 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Conover I) (Congress prohibited banks from investment banking
activities); lanni, supra note 2, at 105-10 (Congress separated commercial from investment
banking in Glass-Steagall).
5. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct.
2979, 2992 (1984) (Becker) (third party commercial paper is security under Glass-Steagall).
Commercial paper is a short-term, unsecured promissory note issued by a corporation. Id. at
2981 n.l. Commercial paper of a corporation sold and dealt in by a bank as agent is called
third party commercial paper. Id. at 2981. Corporations issue commercial paper as a substitute
for borrowing from a bank. See 5 V. DiLORENZO, W. SCHLICHTING & J. COOPER, BANKING
LAW § 96.13 (1984) (commercial paper is alternative to borrowing) [hereinafter cited as
DiLORENZo].
6. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 639 (1971) (commercial bank
operation of nontrust collective investment fund is violation of Glass-Steagall Act). A managing
agency account is a contractual agreement whereby a bank provides investment advice and
assumes investment discretion over funds deposited by a customer. See DILORENZO, supra note
5, at § 96.08; see also 12 C.F.R. § 9.1(h) (1984) (definition of managing agent).
7. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct.
3003, 3012 (1984) (Schwab) (Glass-Steagall does not prohibit bank holding company from
acquiring retail brokerage company as affiliate). A retail discount broker sells securities at a
lower commission than full-service brokerage firms without investment advice or analysis. Id.
at 3005 n.2.
8. See Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,
78 (1981) (investment advisory services by bank do not violate Glass-Steagall). An investment
advisor is any person who regularly furnishes advice on purchasing, selling or investing in
securities. Id. at 50 n.4.
9. See supra notes 5-8 (cases determining whether various bank services violate Glass-
Steagall Act).
10. 26 U.S.C. § 408 (1982); see infra notes 101-109 and accompanying text (discussion of
ERISA). In 1974, Congress added § 408 to the Internal Revenue Code to include tax benefits
to encourage retirement savings. I.R.C. § 408 (1984).
11. See 26 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1982) (Congress authorized banks to offer individual retirement
accounts). ERISA defined individual retirement accounts (IRAs) as trusts created for the
exclusive benefit of individuals or their beneficiaries. I.R.C. § 408(a) (1984). ERISA allows
individuals to contribute up to 2000 dollars annually in an IRA. Id. § 408(a)(1). A married
couple with only one spouse working may contribute up to 2,250 dollars. Id. § 219(a), (c).
Individuals receive a tax deduction equal to the amount contributed. Id. § 219(a). Distributions
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establish collective investment trusts' 2 for investment of IRA trust funds in
order to offer customers a more diversified retirement plan. 3 The Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency approved the collective investment trust
applications as valid under Glass-Steagall.' 4 Two federal district courts
reviewing the Comptroller's decisions have reached different conclusions
concerning the validity of the Comptroller's decisions in light of the Glass-
Steagall Act's prohibition against dealing in securities."
The Glass-Steagall Act developed out of concerns about the securities
investment activities of national banks in the 1920s and early 1930s.16 The
collapse of the stock market in 1929 prompted Senator Glass to introduce
legislation into Congress advocating a separation of commercial banking and
investment banking activities. '7 Congress feared that excessive investment
activities in securities by commercial banks would lead to instability of
received from the IRA before the individual reaches the age of 59 1/2 are subject to a 10%
withdrawal penalty. Id. § 408(f)(1).
12. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.11(c), 9.18 (1985) (collective investment fund discussed). A
collective investment trust is a fund of pooled trust assets invested collectively by a trustee
instead of individually by investors. Id. § 9.11 (c). For example, 100 participants each may place
2000 dollars in a trust fund, the bank trustee then aggregates the money into a total pool of
200,000 dollars and invests the total sum.
13. See Lowy, supra note 1, at 57-61, 133-37 (Citibank, Wells Fargo Bank and Bank of
California have proposed collective investment trusts for IRAs); infra notes 119-40 and accom-
panying text (discussion of Citibank proposed IRA collective investment trust); infra notes 149-
67 and accompanying text (discussion of Wells Fargo and Bank of California proposed collective
investment trusts for IRAs).
14. See [1982-83 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 99,339 (OCT. 21, 1982)
(Comptroller ruled that IRA collective investment trusts do not violate Glass-Steagall); infra
notes 118-40 and accompanying text (discussion of Comptroller's decision for Citibank's IRAs).
In addition to issuing approval for Citibank to offer collective investment trusts for IRAs, the
Comptroller made identical rulings for Wells Fargo Bank on January 27, 1984 and for Bank of
California on January 31, 1984. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 593 F. Supp. 846, 849
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (Conover I) (Comptroller approved collective investment trusts for Wells Fargo
and Bank of California).
15. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 596 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D.D.C. 1984) (Conover
I1) (district court affirmed Comptroller's decision which approved IRA collective investment
trust); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 593 F. Supp. 846, 858 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Conover I)
(district court set aside Comptroller's ruling allowing collective investment for IRA as contrary
to Glass-Steagall); see also infra notes 186-219 and accompanying text (comparing and discussing
Conover I and Conover II).
16. See S. REP. No. 77, supra note 2, at 6-8 (deterioration of banking system contributed
to need for Glass-Steagall); DILORENZO, supra note 5, § 96.02[l] (discussing concerns leading
to Glass-Steagall); Ianni, supra note 2, at 103-05 (discussion of concerns about bank investments
that lead to Glass-Steagall); supra notes 1-2 (discussion of history and concerns of Glass-Steagall
Act); see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629-34 (1971) (Congress concerned
about investment activities of banks before Glass-Steagall).
17. See S. 4723, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 72 CONG. REc. 10,973 (1930) (Senator Glass'
proposed banking bill); DILORENZO, supra note 5, at § 96.02[1l] (Senator Glass introduced bill
after stock market crash). Senator Glass introduced several banking bills during the years 1931
and 1932 until the Senate passed S. 1631 in May 1933. See Lowy, supra note 1, at 23-31
(discussion of banking bills introduced by Senator Glass that resulted in Glass-Steagall Act).
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financial institutions."' Congress, therefore, passed the Glass-Steagall Act to
reestablish public confidence in the banking system,' 9 eliminate inherent
lending conflicts of interest due to promotional pressures from dealing in
securities20 and make the commercial banking system itself more sound. 2'
The Glass-Steagall Act contains four sections that deal with the separa-
tion of commercial and investment banking activities. 22 Section 16 of the Act
prohibits national banks from underwriting any issue of security or stock
and provides that a bank cannot purchase stock for the bank's own account.2
Section 16, however, allows banks to purchase securities for the accounts of
customers. 24 Section 21 of the Act is a corollary to section 16 providing that
18. See S. REP. No. 77, supra note 2, at 3-10 (investment in speculative securities by
banks was dangerous); lanni, supra note 2, at 103-04 (bank failures resulted from unsound
credit and banking).
19. See H. REP. No. 150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1933) (public confidence in banking
system is essential for stability of system); 75 CONG. Rac. 9912 (1932) (statements of Sen.
Bulkley) (bad bank investments impair confidence of depositors); see also Investment Co. Inst.
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 632-34, 637 (1971) (discussion of public confidence factor in Glass-
Steagall); lanni, supra note 2, at 103 (restoration of public confidence was factor in passage of
Glass-Steagall).
20. See HEARINGS PURSUANT TO S. RES. 71 BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 71st Cong., 3d Sess., 237, 1063-64 (1931) (potential
bank conflicts with loans and affiliates were problem leading to Glass-Steagall) [hereinafter
cited as HEARINGS S. RES. 71]; 75 CONG. REc. 9912 (1932) (statements of Sen. Bulkley) (banker
may not act disinterestedly due to promotional interests of investment activity); see also
DILORENZO, supra note 5, at 96.02[1] (banks desire to promote investments may create conflicts);
lanni, supra note 2, at 103 (loan and affiliate conflicts are potential problems of bank
investments); infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (discussion of potential bank investment
conflicts). In Investment Company Institute v. Camp, the Supreme Court stated that Congress
passed Glass-Steagall, in part, to alleviate fears that a bank would lend money to the issuer of
a security held by the bank, to a customer purchasing securities or to an affiliate dealing in
securities. 401 U.S. at 631.
21. See S. Ra,. No. 77, supra note 2, at 10-12 (Congress passed Glass-Steagall to make
banking more sound); lanni, supra note 2, at 103 (Congress enacted Glass-Steagall to solidify
commercial banking system).
22. See 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (Glass-Steagall is §§ 16, 20, 21 and 32 of Banking Act);
DILORENZO, supra note 5, at § 96.02 (discussion of Glass-Steagall Act); Karmel, Glass-Steagall:
Some Critical Reflections, 97 BANKING L.J. 631, 633 (1980) (provisions of Glass-Steagall Act
discussed); lanni, supra note 2, at 105-110 (discussion of Glass-Steagall provisions); infra notes
23-28 and accompanying text (detailed discussion of §§ 16, 20, 21 and 32 of Glass-Steagall
Act).
23. Banking Act, ch. 89, § 16, 48 Stat. 163 (1933) (12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1982)).
Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act provides that commercial banks shall limit the business of
dealing in securities to nonrecourse buying and selling for the account of customers. Id.
Nonrecourse means that a bank may handle securities for a customer only without risking the
bank's own assets. See DiLORENZO, supra note 5, at 96.02[2]. Banks may, however, underwrite
securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (seventh) (1982); see DILORENZO, supra note 5, at 96.02[2] (discussion
of § 16 of Glass-Steagall); lanni, supra note 2, at 105-10 (discussing § 16 of Glass-Steagall Act);
infra note 24 and accompanying text (banks may make limited investments).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1982). Section 16 of Glass-Steagall provides that commercial
banks may engage in nonrecourse security activity for the account of customers. Id. Additionally,
the Act states that banks may purchase securities for the bank's own account subject to
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entities engaged in underwriting, selling or distributing stocks, bonds, notes
or debentures may not engage in the business of receiving deposits. 25 Finally,
sections 2026 and 3227 of the Act prohibit affiliation between Federal Reserve
member banks and investment companies.
28
In evaluating the applicability of Glass-Steagall to a particular commer-
cial banking activity, the question that often arises is whether Glass-Steagall
is an absolute barrier between commercial and investment banking or whether
the Act is a barrier only for specific hazards. 29 The United States Supreme
Court, in Investment Company Institute v. Camp,30 provided the initial
direction for handling a Glass-Steagall security inquiry.3 ' In Camp, the First
regulations of the Comptroller of the Currency. Id. The limitations of the Act do not apply to
United States, state or political subdivision obligations. Id. The Comptroller issued regulations
on investment securities that separated into three categories the types of securities in which a
bank may deal for the bank's own account. 12 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.9 (1985). Type I securities are
the governmental obligations listed in § 16 such as United States, State and political subdivision
obligations. 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(c) (1985). A bank may underwrite, purchase and sell Type I
securities. Id. Type II securities are securities that a bank may underwrite, purchase and sell
subject to a 10% limitation, including, in part, obligations of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, the Tennessee Valley authority, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, the Asian Development Bank and political subdivisions or agencies of a State.
Id. §1.3(d). Type III securities are securities that a bank may own but which the bank may not
deal or underwrite, such as United States government obligations and Federal Home Loan bank
obligations. Id. § 1.3 (e). See DiLoRENzo, supra note 5, at 96.02[2] (discussion of types of
securities in which banks may invest); lanni, supra note 2, at 107-09 (Comptroller's rules on
permissible bank investment activity).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1982). Section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act provides that entities
engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing stocks, bonds, debentures,
notes or other securities can not engage in the business of taking deposits. Id.; see DILORENZO,
supra note 5, at 96.02[2] (discussion of § 21 of Glass-Steagall Act); lanni, supra note 2, at 102
n.13 (§ 21 of Glass-Steagall prohibits investment companies from engaging in commercial
banking).
26. Banking Act, ch. 89, § 20, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
377 (1982)). Section 20 of Glass-Steagall prohibits banks from affiliating with entities engaged
in the investment business. Id.; see Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct. 3003, 3009-11 (1984) (Schwab) (discussing § 20 of Glass-Steagall); see
also DILORENZO, supra note 5, at 96.1613] (§ 20 prohibits affiliation between commercial and
investment banking).
27. Banking Act, ch. 89, § 32, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
78 (1982)) (§ 32 of Glass-Steagall Act prohibits individuals from serving simultaneously as
officers, directors or employees of both investment company and commercial bank). Id.; see
Schwab, 104 S. Ct. at 3010-11 (discussing § 32 of Glass-Steagall); see also DILORENZO, supra
note 5, at 96.1613] (§ 32 of Glass-Steagall prohibits interlocking directorates).
28. See supra notes 26-27 (discussing § 20 and § 32 of Glass-Steagall). Glass-Steagall
applies explicitly to Federal Reserve member banks; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
however, generally applies Glass-Steagall to Fed. nonmembers. See Lowy, supra note 1, at 67-
86 (FDIC generally follows Glass-Steagall).
29. See DiLORENZO, supra note 5, at 96.02[2] (judicial analysis revealed that Glass-Steagall
may prevent only unsafe banking practices rather than provide absolute barrier to bank
investments).
30. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
31. See lanni, supra note 2, at 112 (Camp decision was first analysis of security under §
19851
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National City Bank of New York obtained approval from the Comptroller
of the Currency to offer a managing agency account (or nontrust collective
investment fund) to bank customers pursuant to Regulation 932 of the
Comptroller.33 The petitioners 4 attacked portions of Regulation 9 and spe-
cifically the Comptroller's approval of the managing agency account and
asserted that the fund was a security under Glass-Steagall. 5 The United
States District Court for the District of Columbia held that the challenged
portions of Regulation 9 and the bank fund violated Glass-Steagall.3 6 The
Comptroller and First National City Bank appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit where the court
consolidated the case with an appeal of a Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC) order by the National Association of Securities Dealers.1 The District
of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court and affirmed the SEC order)3
8
16 of Glass-Steagall). Investment Company Institute v. Camp is one of the seminal cases most
courts have cited when addressing a Glass-Steagall problem. See, e.g., Securities Ind. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct. 2979, 2983-85 (1984) (discussion of Camp);
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 64-68 (1981)
(Camp set forth judicial concerns about Glass-Steagall); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 596
F. Supp. 1496, 1499-1500 (D.D.C. 1984) (Conover II) (Camp was seminal case on Glass-
Steagall); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 593 F. Supp. 846, 851-52 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Conover
I) (discussion of Camp). Camp was not, however, the first Supreme Court analysis of Glass-
Steagall. lanni, supra note 2, at 112 n.60. The first Supreme Court case to analyze Glass-
Steagall was Board of Governors v. Agnew. See Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,
443-49 (1947) (court examined § 32 of Glass-Steagall).
32. 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-9.22 (1985). The Comptroller of the Currency enacted Part 9 of title
12 of the Code of Federal Regulations as regulations governing the fiduciary powers of national
banks. Id. Part 9 governs trust departments, fiduciary investments, collective investments and
other fiduciary functions. Id. §§ 9.7, 9.9, 9.11, 9.18, 9.21, 9.22.
33. 401 U.S. at 619. In Investment Company Institute v. Camp, the First National City
Bank instituted a plan calling for customers to place $10,000 to $50,000 with the bank and to
authorize the bank to act as managing agent for the funds. Id. at 622. The bank placed the
money deposited by the customers in a fund and issued redeemable, transferable units of
participation in return. Id. The bank then acted as underwriter, investment advisor and custodian
with respect to the units of participation. Id. at 623. See supra note 6 (definition of managing
agency account).
34. Id. at 618-19. The Camp litigation initially involved two separate suits. Id. The
petitioners in one suit were the Investment Company Institute (ICI), which is an association of
open-end investment companies, and several individual investment companies. Id. at 618. These
petitioners brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia attacking
the First National Bank managing agency account and Regulation 9 of the Comptroller. Id. at
618-19. The petitioner in the second suit was the National Association of Securities Dealers,
which challenged an order by the Securities Exchange Commission that partially exempted the
First National City Bank plan from the Investment Company Act of 1940. Id. at 619.
35. Id. at 618-19. The Camp petitioners alleged that the managing agency account offered
by the bank violated the Glass-Steagall prohibition against banks dealing in securities. Id. at
619.
36. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624, 648 (D.D.C. 1967), rev'd, 420 F.2d
83 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
37. 401 U.S. at 619.
38. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd,
401 U.S. 617 (1971).
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit
and held that the First National City Bank managing agency account was an
invalid security activity in violation of Glass-Steagall.3
9
The Camp decision disallowing nontrust managing agency accounts is
important because the Supreme Court displayed a method for evaluating
Glass-Steagall security aspects of a commercial banking service.4 ' One com-
mentator noted that the Camp Court formulated a two-step approach to
evaluating banking services under Glass-Steagall. 41 The first step that the
Court took was a literal inquiry into the meaning of security under Glass-
Steagall.4 2 Second, the Court made a nonliteral analysis of the legislative
intent underlying the enactment of Glass-Steagall. 43 The Camp Court began
the literal analysis by noting that section 16 of the Act prohibits commercial
banks from underwriting securities or purchasing securities for the bank's
own account. 4 The Court further noted, however, that Glass-Steagall does
not define expressly the term "security. ' 45 The Court then examined the
language of Glass-Steagall and concluded that the proposed managing agency
account effectively was equivalent to an open-end mutual fund 46 and that
such a mutual fund operated by a commercial bank would be a violation of
39. 401 U.S. at 620, 639. The Supreme Court, in Camp, reasoned that the literal language
of Glass-Steagall and the legislative intent underlying the Act indicated that the First National
City Bank managing agency account violated Glass-Steagall. See id. at 625, 639; see also infra
notes 44-65 and accompanying text (Camp Court's analysis of Glass-Steagall).
40. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 623-39 (Court's analysis of Glass-Steagall issue); Ianni, supra
note 2, at 116 (judicial analysis in Camp signified Supreme Court's position on meaning of
security under Glass-Steagall).
41. See lanni, supra note 2, at 112-16, 135-37 (Supreme Court has two-prong analysis for
applicability of Glass-Steagall); infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (Camp court produced
literal and nonliteral analysis of Glass-Steagall).
42. 401 U.S. at 624-25; see lanni, supra note 2, at 112-14 (Camp Court stated that literal
terms of Glass-Steagall act prohibited managing agency account); see infra notes 44-52 and
accompanying text (Camp court's literal analysis).
43. 401 U.S. at 626-638; see Ianni, supra note 2, at 114-16 (nonliteral legislative intent of
Glass-Steagall prohibited Camp managing agency account). One commentator termed the
examination of the legislative intent underlying Glass-Steagall and discussion of Glass-Steagall
hazards as a nonliteral analysis because the examination deals with statutory purpose and not
statutory language. lanni, supra note 2, at 116. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text
(discussion of Camp Court's nonliteral legislative intent analysis of Glass-Steagall).
44. 401 U.S. at 623-24; see supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (text and discussion
of § 16 of Glass-Steagall).
45. 401 U.S. at 627, 635; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1982) (no definition of
"security" in Glass-Steagall); infra note 94 (definition of "security" in other federal security
statutes).
46. See 401 U.S. at 625, 625 n.l1. A mutual fund is an open-end investment company
that represents itself as being engaged in the business of dealing in securities. Id. at 625 n. 11.
An open-end investment company is a company that deals in any redeemable security of which
the company is the issuer. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(21), 80a-3(a)(1), 80a-5(a)(l) (1982)
(definition of open-end investment company in Investment Company Act of 1940). A redeemable
security is one in which, upon presentment to the issuer, the holder receives his proportionate
share of the issuer's net assets or the cash equivalent. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a)(32) (1982)
(definition of "redeemable").
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section 16 of Glass-Steagall 4 7 The Court found that the First National City
Bank managing agency account violated the literal language of Glass-Steagall
for several reasons. 48 The first indicia of a security in violation of Glass-
Steagall that the Court found was the investment advisor-investor relationship
between the customer and the bank, which is different from the standard
safekeeper-depositor relationship.4 9 The second indicia that the Court noted
was the freely transferable and redeemable nature of the fund, which was
similar to other securities. 0 Third, the Camp Court observed that the
managing agency account was economically in direct competition with mutual
funds and that the differences between the account and a mutual fund were
subtle at best.5 Finally, the Court concluded that a mutual fund buys and
sells stocks for its own account and, therefore, if a bank offered to provide
such a service to customers, the bank would violate section 16 of Glass-
Steagall .
52
The Camp Court, in addition to its literal analysis of the managing
agency account as a security, also undertook a nonliteral analysis of the
Congressional intent underlying the Glass-Steagall Act. 3 The Court observed
that Congress believed that commercial bank investment activity creates
certain hazards that outweigh any policy of convenience, competition or
expertise in favor of permitting bank entry into the investment field.14 The
Camp Court identified both obvious and subtle hazards that Congress
intended Glass-Steagall to eliminate.5 The first hazard the Court identified
was the obvious danger to a commercial bank's financial viability resulting
47. 401 U.S. at 625; see infra notes 49-62 and accompanying text (discussion of Camp
Court's reasoning for holding that managing agency account violated Glass-Steagall); supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussion of § 16 of Glass-Steagall).
48. 401 U.S. at 622-25; see infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (discussion of Camp
Court's literal analysis of Glass-Steagall).
49. 401 U.S. at 625. The Camp Court noted that First National City Bank acted in an
investment advisory context toward fund customers. Id.; see Ianni, supra note 2, at 112-13 (role
of bank as advisor and customer as investor departs from normal safekeeper-depositor rules).
50. 401 U.S. at 622. The Camp Court noted that the fund participants could freely redeem
or transfer units of participation to other fund participants. Id. Free transferability and
redeemability are more qualities of a stock than of a deposit. lanni, supra note 2, at 114.
51. 401 U.S. at 625. The Camp Court stated that the proposed First National City Bank
fund would be in direct competition with mutual funds. Id. The direct competition with a
mutual fund security suggested to the Court that the bank fund and mutual fund were equivalent.
Id.; lanni, supra note 2, at 114.
52. 401 U.S. at 625, 625 n.ll.
53. 401 U.S. at 623-38; see Ianni, supra note 2, at 114-16 (Camp Court's legislative
analysis of Glass-Steagall's meaning of security); supra note 43 (discussion of meaning of
nonliteral analysis).
54. 401 U.S. at 630; see infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussion of hazards
Congress designed Glass-Steagall to prevent).
55. 401 U.S. at 630-34; see Ianni, supra note 2, at 114-16 (discussion of Glass-Steagall
hazards examined in Camp). Many of the Glass-Steagall hazards may apply to stock brokers,




from unsound or imprudent investments in securities.5 6 Additionally, the
Court expressed great concern with more subtle Glass-Steagall hazards, such
as the promotional pressure a bank faces to maintain public confidence,
which may tempt a bank to shore up an affiliate with unsound loans.57 The
pressure to support an affiliate would result if the affiliate dealt in securities
and some of the securities fared poorly.', Moreover, the pressure to sell
investments may cause a bank to lend more freely, liberally and possibly
unwisely to companies in whose securities the bank has invested. -9 Second,
the Court stated that Congress feared that banks would lose customer good
will because of customer losses on stocks bought in reliance on the bank's
advice. "° Third, Congress recognized that promotional pressures may cause
banks to lend to customers in anticipation that the customer would purchase
stocks and securities and that such speculation could be dangerous to bank
stability.6' Fourth, the Court noted that Congress questioned whether a bank
could render impartial investment advice consistently with the bank's pro-
motional interest in selling securities. 6 Finally, the Camp Court referred to
the Congressional concern that lending a bank's name and reputation to its
securities activities may screen from investors the inherent risk in securities
that an investor should recognize.
63
Upon examining the literal indicia that First National City Bank's
managing agency account was a Glass-Steagall security and the legislative
history and intent underlying the Act, the Camp Court concluded that the
fund in question was an invalid exercise of banking power. 64 The Court
opinion contained important dictum, however, which noted that the Glass-
Steagall hazards that concerned Congress are not present when a bank
undertakes to purchase securities for customers for a fiduciary as opposed
to an investment purpose. 6- This distinction is important because fiduciary
56. 401 U.S. at 630.
57. Id. The Camp Court noted that banks frequently established securities affiliates to
deal in securities. Id. The Camp Court stated that the securities affiliate and the bank are
closely related in the public's mind, and, therefore a bank may lend to an affiliate that
performed poorly in order to maintain public confidence. Id. at 631.
58. Id.
59. Id. The Camp Court observed that the pressure to sell investments in order to make
an affiliate more sound may lead a bank to lend to the issuers of securities held by the affiliate.
Id.
60. Id. The Camp Court noted that a bank's reputation may suffer if bank customers
lost money on securities bought in reliance on the bank's investment advice. Id. The Court felt
that Congress feared that the loss of customer goodwill may hamper a bank during a period of
security market deflation. Id.
61. Id. at 632; see S. REP. No. 77, supra note 2, at 9-10 (promotional demands on bank
to lend to investment customers is dangerous).
62. 401 U.S. at 633; see 75 CoNG. REc. 9912 (1932) (statements of Sen. Bulkley) (banks
may have difficulty remaining disinterested with investment customers because bank has financial
stake in obtaining investment).
63. 401 U.S. at 632.
64. Id. at 639.
65. Id. at 638.
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or trust services are not subject to the investment criticisms stated in Camp.66'
Three United States Supreme Court opinions subsequent to Camp sup-
port the two-step literal analysis and legislative history approach for exam-
ining a commercial bank service under the Glass-Steagall Act. 67 In Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute
(IC), 68 the Court examined the Federal Reserve Board's amendment of
Regulation y, 69 which governs closely-related banking activities and the
Federal Reserve's approval of a closed-end investment advisory service
offered by a bank holding company. 70 The Federal Reserve Board had
determined that the Glass-Steagall Act did not prohibit closed-end advisory
services conducted by bank holding companies and their subsidiaries., The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled
that the advisory service was not in violation of Glass-Steagall, but that the
Bank Holding Company Act 72 prohibited such a service. 73 In reviewing the
District of Columbia Circuit holding, the Supreme Court concluded that the
Federal Reserve Board's amendment to Regulation Y allowing bank holding
66. Id. The Camp Court acknowledged that the hazards which Congress designed Glass-
Steagall to prevent would not be present when a bank commingled funds for a true fiduciary
purpose rather than as an investment. Id. Many courts and commentators have considered the
distinction between fiduciary and investment purposes to be very important because trust and
fiduciary services may not be subject to the Glass-Steagall criticisms enunciated in Camp. See,
e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 596 F. Supp. 1496, 1501 (D.D.C. 1984) (Conover II)
(Camp Court drew distinction between investment and fiduciary funds); Investment Co. Inst.
v. Conover, 593 F. Supp. 846, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Conover I) (commingled trust assets valid
under Glass-Steagall if trust has true fiduciary purpose); DILORENZO, supra note 5, at 96.08[21
(Camp Court careful to note difference between investment and fiduciary purpose).
67. See infra notes 68, 77 & 78 (citations of post-Camp Glass-Steagall cases).
68. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
69. 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.1-.142 (1985). Regulation Y regulates bank holding company
nonbank activities and acquisition of control of banks by individuals or companies. Id.
§225.1(b). Regulation Y deals with bank holding company activities, such as computer subsi-
diaries, Edge Act Corporations, mortgage companies, insurance activities and escrow arrange-
ments. Id. §§ 225.118,.121,.122,.128,.134.
70. 450 U.S. at 51-52. A closed-end investment company, unlike an open-end investment
company or mutual fund, does not redeem shares or securities from a customer once the
company has issued the security. Id. at 51. A shareholder of a closed-end investment company
must sell shares in the market place instead. Id.
71. Id. at 52. The Federal Reserve Board stated that a bank may sponsor, control or
organize a closed-end investment company as long as the company does not engage primarily
in sale, issuance and distribution of securities. Id. at 52 n.12.
72. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1841 (1982)). The stated purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act was defining bank holding
companies, controlling future expansion and inducing divestiture of nonbanking interests. Id.
73. Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 606 F.2d 1004,
1006 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 46 (1981). The District of Columbia Circuit, in IC!,
ruled that § 16 and § 21 of Glass-Steagall apply only to banks and not bank holding companies,
but the circuit court held that the Bank Holding Company Act effectuates the Glass-Steagall
purpose of completely separating commercial and investment banking. Id. at 1013, 1014, 1016-
24. The ICI court held, therefore, that the Bank Holding Company Act prohibited bank holding
company investment advisory services. Id. at 1024.
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companies to obtain closed-end advisory services did not violate the Glass-
Steagall Act, the legislative intent of Glass-Steagall or the Bank Holding
Company Act.74 ICI is significant because the Court followed the two-step
analysis established in Camp to evaluate the security or nonsecurity status
of a commercial banking service.
75
Three years after the ICI decision, the Supreme Court handed down two
additional cases discussing analysis of the term "security" under the Glass-
Steagall Act. 76 The Supreme Court decided Securities Industry Association
v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Becker)77 and Securities
Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(Schwab)7 during the same term. In Becker, Bankers Trust Company began
serving as an agent for third-party commercial paper7 9 for several customers. 0
The petitioners, A. G. Becker, Inc. and the Securities Industry Association,
sought a ruling from the Federal Reserve stating that the bank's commercial
paper activity violated Glass-Steagall's prohibition against banks dealing in
securities.8 The Federal Reserve Board concluded that handling the com-
mercial paper was a valid exercise for the bank under Glass-Steagall. s2 The
Board based the conclusion on a functional analysis of the commercial paper
74. 450 U.S. at 55, 78.
75. See lanni, supra note 2, at 117-18 (ICI Court followed Camp Court analysis of Glass-
Steagall); see also Comment, Commercial Law-Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System v. Investment Company Institutes: The Continuing Conflict Between Commercial and
Investment Banking, 61 N.C. L. Ray. 378, 391 (1983) (Supreme Court in ICI noted that
complete separation of investment and commercial banking is not necessary in order to comply
with Act).
76. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct.
3003, 3012 (1984) (Schwab) (Supreme Court analysis of bank acquisition of retail brokerage
company); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct.
2979, 2983-92 (1984) (Becker) (Supreme Court analysis of commercial paper under Glass-
Steagall); infra notes 79-98 and accompanying text (discussion of Becker and Schwab).
77. 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984).
78. 104 S. Ct. 3003 (1984).
79. See supra note 5 (definition of commercial paper); see also Comment, The Commercial
Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 362, 363-64 (1972) (commercial paper
definition).
80. Becker, 104 S. Ct. 2981-82. In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (Becker), Bankers Trust Company served as agent for several
corporate customers by placing the customer corporation's commercial paper on the market.
Id. Such bank activity with the commercial paper of corporations other than the bank is third
party commercial paper. Id.
81. A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 519 F. Supp. 602,
604-5 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984). The
petitioners in Becker met with the General Counsel of the Federal Reserve Board (Board) to
discuss third party commercial paper activity by commercial banks. Id. The General Counsel
issued a document stating that the commercial paper activity was legal. Id. at 605; see Board
of Governors of Federal Reserve System Determination, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] C.C.H. FED.
BANKING LAW REP. 97,900 (JUNE 28, 1979) (content of General Counsel's determination on
commercial paper). The petitioners sought review by the Federal Reserve Board and the Board
ruled that the commercial paper was legal. 519 F. Supp. at 605.
82. Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2982.
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that weighed factors to determine whether commercial paper more closely
resembled a commercial loan transaction or an investment transaction. 3 The
Board concluded that commercial paper functions more like a loan than an
investment.8 4 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
reversed the Board's ruling 5 and rejected the Board's functional analysis .
6
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit reversed the district court and reaffirmed the Board's functional
analysis.8 7 The United States Supreme Court then reversed the District of
Columbia Circuit and rejected the functional analysis.88 The Becker Court,
like the ICI Court, followed the Camp statutory and legislative intent
analysis, but Becker added additional guidelines. 9 The Becker Court noted
that since Glass-Steagall does not define the term "security", the ordinary
meaning is the proper definition. 90 The Court stated that the Securities Act
of 1933, 91 the Securities Exchange Act of 193492 and the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 91 while not dispositive, contain definitions
of "security" that assist in ascertaining the effect of Glass-Steagall on
particular banking services. 94 The Court also emphasized the importance of
83. Id.; see DiLoRENzo, supra note 5, at 96.1312] (discussion of Federal Reserve Board
ruling on commercial paper); lanni, supra note 2, at 120 (functional analysis for Glass-Steagall
problem); Lowy, supra note 1, at 46, 132-33 (discussion of functional analysis of commercial
paper).
84. Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2982.
85. Becker, 519 F. Supp. at 616, rev'd, 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
2979 (1984).
86. Id. at 615-16; see Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2982 (discussion of district court's rejection
of functional analysis).
87. A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 693 F.2d 136, 151
(D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2979 (1984).
88. Id. at 147-51; see Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2982, 2989, 2992 (discussion of District of
Columbia Circuit's adoption of functional analysis). The District of Columbia Circuit, in
Becker, adopted the functional analysis and concluded that commercial paper more resembled
a loan than investment because of the low default rate, large amounts of issue and sophistication
of buyers. Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2982-83.
89. Id. at 2984-92; see supra note 42 (discussion of Camp literal analysis); supra notes
79-88 and accompanying text (discussion of Becker Court analysis of Glass-Steagall); infra notes
90-95 (Becker Court analysis of Glass-Steagall).
90. Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2986; see Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 299 (1983)
(assumption that ordinary meaning of term satisfied legislative intent); lanni, supra note 2, at
119-120 (discussion of district court's definition of security that Becker Court subsequently
affirmed).
91. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.
(1982)).
92. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a et seq. (1982)).
93. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 79 et seq. (1982)).
94. Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2987. Section 77b of the Securities Act of 1933 defines security
to include any note, stock, bond or certificate of deposit for a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 also defines security to include any note, stock, bond or
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the bank's role in the transaction, an element which the Federal Reserve
Board's functional analysis ignored in favor of an analysis of the nature and
function of the financial instrument.95
In the companion case to Becker, Securities Industry Association v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Schwab), the Supreme
Court reviewed the Federal Reserve Board's approval of BankAmerica
Corporation's proposed acquisition of The Charles Schwab Corporation, a
retail discount broker. 96 The Supreme Court, in Schwab, continued to follow
the Camp two-step literal analysis and legislative intent analysis and approved
BankAmerica's acquisition of the retail brokerage company. 97 The Supreme
Court analysis in the line of cases including Camp, ICI, Becker and Schwab
thus indicates that both a literal analysis of the language of the Glass-Steagall
Act and an analysis of the legislative intent underlying that Act are important
factors in determining the validity of a banking service under Glass-Steagall."
As the United States Supreme Court cases indicate, the two-step analysis
of Glass-Steagall presents a framework in which to examine new bank
products that pose potential Glass-Steagall "security" problems. 99 One such
new bank product is a commingled collective investment trust for individual
retirement account (IRA) funds.' °° Congress authorized IRAs in the Employee
certificate or deposit for a security. Id. § 78c(IO). The 1934 Act also includes definitions for
"equity securities" and "exempted securities." Id. § 78(c)(1 1), (12). The definition of "exempted
security" includes common trust funds or collective investment funds managed by a bank in a
fiduciary capacity. Id. § 78c(12). The Public Utility Holding Company Act, in part, defines
security to include any note, draft, bond, debenture or any instrument commonly known as
security. Id. § 79b(16).
95. Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2989.
96. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct. 3003,
3005-6 (1984) (Schwab). In Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System (Schwab), BankAmerica Corporation, a bank holding company, applied to
purchase The Charles Schwab Corporation, a retail discount broker. Id. at 3005. A retail
discount broker sells securities at a lower commission than full-service brokerage firms without
investment advice or analysis. Id. at 3005 n.2.
97. Id. at 3006-12.
98. See supra notes 40-66, 68-75 & 79-97 and accompanying text (discussion of Supreme
Court analysis of Glass-Steagall in Camp, ICI, Becker and Schwab).
99. See Ianni, supra note 2, at 135-37 (judicial two-step analysis of Glass-Steagall helpful
for future cases).
100. See Lowy, supra note 1, at 57-61, 133-37 (discussion of commingled IRA accounts);
M. SCHROEDER, BANK OFFICER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL BANKING LAW § 5-30, 577-78 (5th
ed. Supp. 1984) (discussion of Citibank application to issue commingled IRA account); S.
VHITLEY, W. SCHUCHTING & J. COOPER, 2 BANKING LAW § 34.04[3] (discussion of collective
investment trusts) [hereinafter cited as WHITLEY]; [CURRENT] C.C.H. FED. BANKING LAW REP.
99,339 (OCT. 28, 1982) (Comptroller of Currency's analysis of commingled IRA accounts);
O.C.C. Approves Citibank Application to Invest IRA Funds as Fiduciary, 39 Wash. Fin. Rep.
792, 792-93 (Nov. 1, 1982) (discussion of Comptroller's approval of Citibank IRA fund)
[hereinafter cited as Citibank IRA]; see also infra note 102 and accompanying text (definition
of IRA). A collective investment trust is a pooled fund of participant's contributions that a
national bank collectively invests as a fiduciary. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985). Regulation 9 of the
Comptroller governs collective investment trusts. Id.
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Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). '0' ERISA defined an IRA
as a trust created for the benefit of an individual or the individual's
beneficiaries. 0 2 Originally, Congress restricted IRA eligibility to those indi-
viduals not covered by an employer-sponsored retirement plan.""- In 1981,
as a portion of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA),"'4 Congress
expanded eligibility rules for IRAs so that any wages earned by a person
under 70 1/2 years of age qualified for an account." 5 By instituting IRAs,
Congress intended to foster individual retirement savings."'6 In conjunction
with ERISA and ERTA, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to
allow a 2000 dollar annual tax deduction for amounts contributed to an IRA
account.' 0 7 ERISA provided that a bank trustee or other qualifying person
must administer funds contributed to IRAs.' 8 Once contributed, the IRA
funds must remain on deposit until the individual reaches the age of 59 1/2
or other contingencies occur. 0 9
Commercial banks, as IRA trustees, commonly have invested trust assets
in savings accounts, personal investment portfolios or time deposits such as
certificates of deposit." 0 Additionally, the language of section 408(a)(5) of
101. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 408, 83 Stat. 829,
959 (Sept. 2, 1974) (ERISA) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 408 (1982)).
102. 26 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1982). Congress enacted ERISA by amending the Internal Revenue
Code to add § 408. See I.R.C. § 408 (1982); E. MCGUIRE & D. FARNHAM, A BANKER'S GUIDE
TO IRAs 1-9 (3d ed. 1982) (chapter entitled "What Are Individual Retirement Accounts"
discussing concept of IRAs) [hereinafter cited as McGUIRE]. Individual Retirement Accounts
allow individuals to save part of the annual contribution received from an employer and to
receive a tax deduction for the retirement savings. Id. at 3.
103. See S. YOUNG, I PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS § 6A.01, 6A-3-16 (1984) (before
1981 only individuals not covered by employers plan qualified for IRAs).
104. Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 311, 95 Stat. 173, 274 (Aug. 13,
1982) (codified at I.R.C. § 219 (1982)).
105. See I.R.C. § 408 (1982) (individual may deduct contributions to IRA on taxes);
MCGUIRE, supra note 102, at I (all wage earners under 70 1/2 eligible for IRAs); S. YOUNG,
supra note 103, at 6A-16 (individuals already covered by qualified retirement plan are eligible
for IRA account).
106. See McGUIRE, supra note 102, at 7-8 (Congress intended to induce retirement savings
by instituting IRAs). According to the American Bankers Association's Guide to IRAs, only
48% of the nation's workforce are in employer retirement plans. Id. at 7. The lack of adequate
financial planning by those individuals without employer-sponsored plans and high inflation
rates motivated Congress to create IRAs and to encourage individual retirement savings. Id. at
7-8.
107. See I.R.C. §§ 219(1), 408(a)(1) (1982) ($2000 maximum annual contribution in
individual IRA); McGUIRE, supra note 102, at 6 (annual $2000 tax deduction for IRAs); S.
YOUNG, supra note 103, at 6A-14-16 (contribution limitations on IRAs).
108. I.R.C. § 408(a)(2) (1982); see McGURE, supra note 102, at 13-14 (use of banks for
IRA funds).
109. I.R.C. § 408(f) (1982). The Internal Revenue Code applies a 10% withdrawal penalty
to any distribution from an IRA account before the individual reaches the age of 59 1/2. Id. §
408(f)(1). Amounts distributed after retirement are taxable, but the recipient probably will be
in a low tax bracket. See MCGUIRE, supra note 102, at 9 (discussion of distribution of IRA
funds after retirement); see also I.R.C. § 408(d) (1982) (taxation of withdrawal at retirement).
110. See McGuiRE, supra note 102, at 13 (discussion of investment of IRA funds). The
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the Internal Revenue Code states that a bank may commingle IRA trust
assets in a common trust fund or a common investment fund."' Common
investment funds allow a bank to pool participants' funds and invest in
qualified securities.'1 2 Three national commercial banks, Citibank, N.A.
(Citibank),"' Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) and Bank of California,
N.A. (BankCal)," 4 have attempted to establish collective investment trusts
for IRAs."' The banks individually applied, under similar factual circum-
stances, to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for approval to
operate the IRA collective investment trusts."16 The Comptroller issued
identical decisions approving all three bank applications."1
7
The Comptroller's approval of the Citibank plan to operate an IRA
collective investment trust was the first such decision and the Comptroller
duplicated the decision for the Wells Fargo and BankCal applications." 8
Internal revenue Code places very few restrictions on investment of IRA funds. Id. The Code
provides that life insurance contracts are not proper investment vehicles for IRAs. Id.; I.R.C.
§ 408(a)(3). The Code also provides that funds may be commingled only in a common trust
fund or common investment fund. McGuuRE, supra note 102, at 13; I.R.C. § 408(a)(5) (1982).
Commercial banks commonly place IRA funds in the banks savings or time deposit accounts
or personal investment portfolios. See McGuIRE, supra note 102, at 13, 84-88 (factors that go
into consideration of proper investment vehicle for IRA funds). The American Bankers
Association's (ABA) Guide to IRAs stated that a bank may invest IRA funds in regular savings
accounts, but the low interest rate may be less competitive in the market. Id. at 85. According
to the guide, certificates of deposit allow higher rates but require larger contributions. Id. at
86. The ABA Guide stated that personal investment portfolios allow the individual to guide the
investment and are practical with rollover accounts. Id. at 85.
111. I.R.C. § 408(a)(5) (1982); see McGuiRE, supra note 102, at 13, 85 (Code allows use
of commingled funds for IRAs but Securities Exchange Commission took position that com-
mingled funds are subject to Securities Acts).
112. See 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b) (1985) (no investment in stock or security of individual issuer
which would be greater than 10% of the fund).
113. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 596 F. Supp. 1496, 1498-99 (D.D.C. 1984)
(Conover II) (Citibank's attempt to establish collective investment fund for IRAs).
114. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 593 F. Supp. 846, 848 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Conover
I) (attempt by Wells Fargo Bank and Bank of California to establish collective investment fund
for IRAs).
115. See infra notes 118.40 and accompanying text (collective investment fund proposals
for IRAs by Citibank, BankCal and Wells Fargo).
116. See National Bank Operation of Trust Funds For IRA Investment, [1982-83 TRANSFER
BINDER] C.C.H. FED. BANKING LAW RPTR. 99,339, 86,364 (Citibank application to Comptroller
for approval of IRA trust fund) [hereinafter cited as Trust Funds]; see also Conover 11, 596 F.
Supp. at 1501 (Comptroller's ruling for Wells Fargo and BankCal identical to ruling for
Citibank).
117. See Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,382-83 (Comptroller's approval of Citibank
IRA fund); Conover I1, 596 F. Supp. at 1501 (Citibank ruling by Comptroller identical to
rulings for Wells Fargo and BankCal).
118. See Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,364 (Citibank's application to Comptroller for
approval of IRA fund). The Comptroller of the Currency issued approval for Citibank to
operate a collective investment fund for IRAs on October 28, 1982. Id. at 86,363. The
Comptroller issued identical rulings for Wells Fargo Bank on January 27, 1984 and the Bank
of California on January 31, 1984. Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 849. See infra notes 119.40 and
accompanying text (discussion of Comptroller's ruling on Citibank's IRA fund).
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Citibank proposed to establish a collective investment trust under the name
CIT for Citibank IRAs," 9 for which the bank would act as trustee.", Citibank
registered CIT under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Securities
Act of 1933 and the bank proposed to act as investment advisor, custodian,
administrator and transfer agent for the trust.1 2' The Comptroller, in exam-
ining CIT, noted that section 9.18 of title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations'22 allows banks to invest IRA trust assets collectively as fiduci-
aries. 2 3 The Comptroller also observed that Congress confirmed a bank's
power to commingle trust assets in ERISA, which expressly authorized
commingled trust funds and collective investment funds for IRAs.' 24 The
Comptroller, therefore, concluded that ERISA and its legislative history
provided overwhelming support for bank collectively invested IRA trust
funds. 1
25
After concluding that the Comptroller's regulations in section 9.18 and
Congressional action in ERISA authorize collective investment of IRA trust
assets, the Comptroller proceeded to search for potential Glass-Steagall
impediments. 26 The Comptroller compared the similarities and differences
between the Camp managing agency account and the Citibank CIT and
concluded that no Glass-Steagall impediment existed. 27 The Comptroller
noted that the similarities between the Camp fund and Citibank's CIT
included registration under the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the
Securities Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933, and the collective
investment of assets in a fund for participants, not for third-party benefici-
aries. 28 The most important difference that the Comptroller enumerated was
119. See Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1499. In Conover II, Citibank named the bank's
IRA fund Collective Investment Trust for Citibank IRAs (CIT). Id.
120. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,364; see I.R.C. § 408(a)(2) (1982) (authorization
for bank to act as IRA trustee).
121. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,364-65.
122. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985). Section 9.18 of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations
provides that a national bank may invest collectively funds the bank holds as a fiduciary. Id. §
9.18(a). The bank, as fiduciary, may invest collectively in a collective investment fund maintained
by the bank exclusively for investment of funds held by the bank as trustee. Id. § 9.18(a)(1). A
bank may also invest collectively in a fund consisting solely of retirement, pension, profit
sharing or other trusts exempt from federal income taxation. Id. § 9.18(a)(2); see Part 9-
Fiduciary Powers of National Banks and Collective Investment Funds, 5 FED. BANKING LAW
RPTR. 60,568, 38,677-82 (1983) (discussion of § 9.18 of Code of Federal Regulations).
123. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,365.
124. Id. at 86,366-69; see H. R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG.& AD. NEws 4797-98 (common trust fund valid form of IRA investment).
125. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,369.
126. Id. at 86,369-74.
127. Id. at 86,370-74; see Lowy, supra note 1, at 134-36 (Comptroller compared nontrust
collective investment fund in Camp with collective investment trust Citibank proposed and
concluded that Citibank CIT was valid fiduciary service under Glass-Steagall); infra notes 128-
33 and accompanying text (listing distinction and similarities between bank services in Camp
and Citibank cases).
128. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,370; see Lowy, supra note 1, at 134 (three
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that Citibank's CIT would commingle assets in a trust for a fiduciary
purpose, as opposed to the Camp managing agency account, which was a
nontrust activity. 29 In addition, the Comptroller concluded that the Glass-
Steagall hazards outlined in Camp were not present for Citibank's CIT. 30
In particular, the Comptroller stated that the fear of an adverse reputational
effect on banks because of investment activities that fared badly was un-
founded because bank pension and profit funds have operated for years
without such an adverse reputational effect.' IRA collective investment
trusts, as another trust service, should be treated no differently than a
pension trust. 3 2 Similarly, the fear of a bank making imprudent loans to the
trust was eliminated because the bank could not lend to the trust.'3 3 The
Comptroller also concluded that the Glass-Steagall hazards of unsound loans
to fund participants were highly unlikely because of the small contribution
limitations placed on participants and that unsound loans to issuers of
securities held by the trust were unlikely because of the extremely diverse
nature of the trust investments and the insulated nature of the bank trust
department from the commercial and retail side of the bank.
34
similarities between Camp fund and Citibank fund are registration under 1933 Securities Act
and 1940 Investment Company Act and fund for participant's benefit).
129. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,371; see Lowy, supra note 1, at 134-36 (differences
between Citibank fund and Camp fund). The Comptroller emphasized the distinction between
the Camp managing agency account and the Citibank collective investment trust was that the
Citibank CIT was a fiduciary service while the Camp fund was an investment service. Trust
Funds, supra note 116, at 86,371. The fiduciary distinction is very important because the
Comptroller referred to dictum in Camp indicating that a collective investment fund for a
proper fiduciary purpose does not violate Glass-Steagall. Id.; see Camp, 401 U.S. at 638 (Glass-
Steagall hazards not present in true fiduciary service). The fiduciary distinction was the ultimate
distinction on which the opinions in Investment Company Institute v. Conover (Conover I) and
Investment Company Institute v. Conover (Conover II) turned. See Investment Co. Inst. v.
Conover, 596 F. Supp. 1496, 1504 (D.D.C. 1984) (Conover II) (IRA collective investment trust
is proper fiduciary service); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 593 F. Supp. 846, 858 (N.D. Cal.
1984) (Conover I), (IRA collective investment trust promotes investment purpose not fiduciary
purpose).
130. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,372-74; see Lowy, supra note 1, at 135-36 (Glass-
Steagall hazards not present in Citibank IRA fund). The Comptroller stated that Citibank's
CIT would not create the hazards of adverse reputational effect from investment activity and
unsound loans to customers, issuers and the fund that Congress intended Glass-Steagall to
prevent. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,373; see infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text
(discussion of Glass-Steagall hazards in conjunction with Citibank IRAs).
131. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,373. Commercial banks suffer little reputational
harm from trust fund investment of pension fund assets, so IRA accounts should be similar to
pension funds because both are trust department retirement functions. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see § 12 C.F.R. 9.18(b)(8)(i) (1985) (bank cannot lend money to collective
investment fund except for temporary net cash overdrafts); I.R.C. § 4975 (1982) (bank barred
from lending to trust).
134. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,373. The Comptroller stated that a bank would
not likely lend to IRA fund participants because of the small $2000 annual contribution
limitation. Id. In addition, ERISA and the Comptroller's regulations on collective investment
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The Comptroller concluded the analysis of Citibank's CIT proposal with
considerations relating to the federal securities laws.'35 The Comptroller
noted that the SEC has maintained that common trust funds are exempt
from SEC requirements only if offered for a bona fide fiduciary purpose. 3 6
The Comptroller contended that the Citibank CIT proposal served a bona
fide fiduciary function and, therefore, was exempt from the securities laws
for several reasons. 37 The Comptroller stated that the CIT participant would
not seek short-term investment, but rather would seek management of funds
that the customer could not transfer to another individual or withdrawn
from the fund until the participant reaches the age of 59 1/2 without a
substantial withdrawal penalty. 38 Additionally, the Comptroller concluded
that IRA trusts would be subject to other state and federal regulations, such
as ERISA and Regulation 9 of the Comptroller, and therefore, the protection
provided by the securities laws would not be necessary. 3 9 The Comptroller
ruled, therefore, that banks may offer the fiduciary service of collectively
invested IRA assets.
40
In 1962, Congress granted the Comptroller of the Currency the power
trusts prohibit a bank from lending to a fund participant with units of participation in the fund
as security. See I.R.C. § 408(a)(4) (1982) (units in fund nonforfeitable and therefore, not eligible
as security for bank loan); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(8)(i) (1985) (bank cannot lend to trust fund
participant if secured by units of participation in collective investment fund). The Comptroller,
in discussing Citibank's CITs, also concluded that the diversification of a collective investment
fund alleviates fears of unsound loans to issuers of securities held by the fund because of the
insulation of the trust department from the commercial and retail divisions of the bank. Trust
Funds, supra note 116, at 86,373.
135. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,374-81; see infra notes 136-39 (analysis of securities
law affect on Citibank's CIT).
136. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,375. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
steadfastly maintains that no exemption to the securities laws exists where a bank attempts to
collectively invest IRA trust assets. Id.; see United Missouri Bank of Kansas City, N.A., SEC
No-ACTION LETTER (pub. avail. Dec. 31, 1981) (no securities exemption for IRA collective
trust); Lowy, supra note I, at 58 (SEC concluded that no exemption is available for IRA trust
assets for United Missouri Bank of Kansas City); McGutna, supra note 102, at 13, 85 (SEC
maintains that commingled funds for IRAs not exempted from securities laws). The securities
laws, however, contain express exemptions for collective investment funds. See 15 U.S.C. §
77c(a)(2) (1982) (exemption for common trust fund); Id. § 80a-3(c)(3), (11) (exemption for tax-
exempt pension plan). The Comptroller stated that the SEC requires a bona fide fiduciary
purpose and will not exempt funds that are a direct investment vehicle for public investment
like an IRA. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,375-76 (citing H. R. REP. No. 1382, 91st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 43 (1970) & S. REP. No. 184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1969)). The Comptroller
argued that a bank acting as IRA trustee is a traditional fiduciary service and that an IRA
collective trust is not a direct investment vehicle for the public, but rather the trust fund is a
management vehicle for the bank as trustee. Id. at 86,376.
137. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,376; see infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text
(discussion of bona fide fiduciary purpose of Citibank CIT).
138. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,376; see I.R.C. § 408(f)(1)(1982) (10% penalty on
early withdrawal of IRA funds).
139. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,380-81; see I.R.C. § 408 (1982) (ERISA regulation
of IRAs); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985) (Comptroller's regulation of collective investment trusts).
140. Trust Funds, supra note 116, at 86,382-83.
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to administer the trust activities of national banks.' 4' Pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act, parties may seek review of the Comptroller's
trust decisions in federal court. 142 The Comptroller's decision to allow
collective investment of IRA funds for Citibank, Wells Fargo and BankCal
reached the United States District Courts for the District of Columbia and
the Northern District of California pursuant to a challenge by the Investment
Company Institute. 43 The Northern District of California, in Investment
Company Institute v. Conover (Conover I),'44 determined that the banks
promoted the IRA collective investment funds as an investment vehicle and,
therefore, violated the Glass-Steagall Act. 4 The District of Columbia, in
contrast, in Investment Company Institute v. Conover (Conover II), 146 deter-
mined that the collectively invested IRA funds were a valid exercise of
fiduciary banking activity under Glass-Steagall. 47
While the District of Columbia and the Northern District of California
apparently reached opposite conclusions concerning the validity of a collective
investment trust for IRAs, a closer examination of the opinions reveals that
the decisions are not as inconsistent as they first appear. 4 In Conover I,
after a preliminary discussion of standing,149 the Northern California district
141. 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1982). Before Congress authorized the Comptroller to regulate bank
trust activities, the Federal Reserve Board regulated trust activities pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §
248(k). 12 U.S.C. § 248(k) (repealed 1962).
142. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1982); see Camp, Comptroller of the
Currency v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140 (1973) (decisions by Comptroller unquestionably reviewable
by federal courts).
143. See infra notes 144-85 and accompanying text (discussion of Conover I and Conover
II); supra notes 113-40 and accompanying text (discussion of Comptroller's decisions on IRA
trust assets). The Investment Company Institute is a national association of open-end investment
companies, advisors and principal underwriters. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 596 F.
Supp. 1496, 1498 (D.D.C. 1984).
144. 593 F. Supp. 846 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
145. Id. at 858. The Conover I court reasoned that Wells Fargo and BankCal promoted
IRA collective investment trusts as investments, not fiduciary services, and, therefore, violated
Glass-Steagall. Id.
146. 596 F. Supp. 1496 (D.D.C. 1984).
147. Id. at 1502-04. The Conover II court concluded that collective investment trusts are
bona fide fiduciary services duly regulated by the Comptroller and ERISA and, therefore, are
valid under Glass-Steagall. Id.
148. See Conover HI, 596 F. Supp. at 1504 (IRA collective trusts promote bona fide
fiduciary purpose and are valid under Glass-Steagall); Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 858 (collective
investment trust for IRA valid under Glass-Steagall if not advertised as investment vehicle in
competition with mutual funds); infra notes 185-221 and accompanying text (discussion of
Conover I and Conover II).
149. Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 849. The defendants, in Conover I, asserted that the
plaintiff, a national association of open-end investment companies, lacked standing because the
plaintiff's interests did not fall within the zone of interests that Glass-Steagall protected or
regulated. Id. at 850. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing in accordance with
well settled Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 850; see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (discussion of
standing); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1971) (standing for Investment
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court noted that courts pay substantial deference to decisions by the Comp-
troller unless those decisions are inconsistent with legislative mandate or
frustrate Congressional policy.' 50 Next, the Conover I court formed a foun-
dation for analysis by discussing provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act and
the Supreme Court's Camp and Becker decisions. 151 With the foundation in
place, the Northern California district court applied a statutory literal analysis
of the meaning of "security" under Glass-Steagall. 5 2 First, the district court
noted that the plain meaning of "security" under the securities acts was
broad enough to include common trust funds because the Securities Act of
1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940 both explicitly mention
common trust funds. 53 The court noted, however, that although the funds
may be securities under the securities laws, the Supreme Court in Becker
stated that such a characterization does not compel the conclusion that the
funds are securities under Glass-Steagall. 5 4 Instead the securities laws are
merely indicia for Glass-Steagall.
15
The Conover I court acknowledged the Comptroller's argument about
the fiduciary nature of IRA collective trusts stemming from strict ERISA
limitations on IRAs and federal and state regulation, 5 6 but stated that
validity of the fund under Glass-Steagall does not hinge on trust form or
mere regulation by the Comptroller. 5 7 The proper analysis, according to
Company Institute); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970) (zone of interest analysis for standing).
150. Conover , 593 F. Supp. at 850; see Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors
of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct. 3003, 3009 (1984) (Schwab) (substantial deference accorded to
Comptroller's decisions); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
104 S. Ct. 2979, 2983 (1984) (Becker) (courts should exercise deference to Comptroller's rulings
unless rulings are inconsistent with legislative mandate and intent); Conover 11, 596 F. Supp. at
1500 (Comptroller's decision on bank IRAs entitled to great weight); infra note 170 and
accompanying text (discussion of deference to Comptroller's ruling in Conover II).
151. Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 850-52.
152. Id. at 852-56; see infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (language of securities
acts broad enough to include common trust fund but that fact is not dispositive in Glass-
Steagall determination).
153. Id. at 852-53. The Conover I court concluded that the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are broad enough to include a common trust fund as a security
because they include the term "common trust fund". Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1), c(a)(2) (1982)
(security includes common trust fund); Id. § 80a-3(c)(3) (common trust fund exempt from
Investment Company Act).
154. Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 853. The United States Supreme Court, in Becker, noted
that the definitions of securities under the securities laws are indicia of the meaning of similar
terms under Glass-Steagall. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
104 S. Ct. 2979, 2987 (1984) (Becker).
155. Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 853, 853n.9.
156. Id. at 853-54; see supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text (Comptroller's determi-
nation that collective investment of IRA assets is bona fide fiduciary purpose).
157. Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 854. In Conover I, the Northern District of California
concluded that the question presented by collective investment IRA's was not whether a service
was a trust, but whether a service was a bona fide fiduciary service. Id. The Conover I court
also concluded that regulation by ERISA and the Comptroller was not enough to erase Glass-
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Conover 1, is to determine whether the funds serve a true fiduciary purpose
rather than investment purpose. 5 " The Conover I court found evidence of
the investment nature of the collective investment trust for IRAs in Federal
Reserve bulletins which stated that banks should not operate common trust
funds seeking investment alone.5 9 The court noted that the Federal Reserve
bulletins also stated that any advertising of common trust funds should
indicate that the fund is solely for fiduciary not investment purposes. 60 The
Northern District of California concluded that Wells Fargo and BankCal
violated Glass-Steagall because both banks promoted collective investment
IRAs as investment vehicles rather than fiduciary services.'
6 1
After determining that Wells Fargo's and BankCal's promotion of IRA
commingled trust funds violated the fiduciary purpose standard for the
Glass-Steagall Act, the Conover I court concluded that the promotional
activity also presented the hazards that Congress designed Glass-Steagall to
prevent. 62 The Conover I court found that the promotion of IRA funds as
investment vehicles could lead to sales promotional pressure leading to
improvident loans to the fund, participants or securities issuers. 63 The court
concluded that a bank promoting an IRA in direct competition with mutual
funds may advise customers to purchase participations in the fund for reasons
Steagall concerns because Congress intended to separate commercial and investment banking,
not shift regulatory power. Id.
158. Id. at 853; see Camp, 401 U.S. at 638 (commingled assets for true fiduciary purpose
not subject to hazards Glass-Steagall designed to prevent).
159. Id. at 854-55; see 26 FED. REs. BULL. 393 (1943) (common trust fund not valid if
used for investment purposes other than fiduciary purpose).
160. Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 855. The Conover I court noted that the Federal Reserve
Bulletins state that the way in which a bank promotes or advertises a common trust fund may
determine whether the fund serves a true fiduciary purpose or investment purpose. Id. If a
bank over emphasizes the fund as an investment or estate building tool rather than fiduciary
trustee service, the bank may violate the rules of the Federal Reserve. Id.; see 42 FED. REs.
BULL 228 (1956) (advertising of common trust funds for investment rather than fiduciary purpose
is inconsistent with publicity restrictions of the Federal Reserve).
161. Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 855-56. The Conover I court concluded that Wells Fargo
and BankCal promoted IRA collective investment trusts as investments rather than as a fiduciary
trust. Id. at 855. The court noted that the banks sought to attract new customers by promoting
the IRA features as an alternative to a mutual fund. Id. In addition, the court observed that
the banks developed brochures that described the new innovative IRA stock market investments.
Id. at 856. According to the Conover I court, the advertising and promotion of the investment
aspects of the IRA funds indicated that the banks intended the funds for an investment purpose.
Id.
162. Id. at 856-57; see infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text (promotion of IRA
collective investment trust as investment created Glass-Steagall hazards of promotional interest
and improvident loans to customers, security issuers and trust funds).
163. Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 856. The Conover I court stated that the possibility of
imprudent loans by the bank in connection with the collective investment trust exists with IRA
trusts because the bank has a stake in whether a customer chooses the bank's IRA fund or that
of some other trustee. Id. The pressure to promote the fund may lead to unsound loans to
maintain the fund's reputation. Id.
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other than merit.164 In addition, the Conover I court accorded little weight
to the Comptroller's argument that even if the funds otherwise would violate
Glass-Steagall, ERISA expressly authorizes commingled funds for IRAs.'
6 -
The court stated that nothing in the legislative history underlying ERISA
expressly indicated that Congress intended to allow the promotion of IRA
collective funds in violation of Glass-Steagall.' 66 Notably, however, the
Conover I decision did not hold that banks cannot establish common trust
funds for IRAs but instead held that banks cannot market or advertise such
funds to compete with mutual funds. 67
The District of Columbia decided Conover II with the benefit of previ-
ously examining the Northern District of California's earlier Conover I
decision.'6 1 After laying out the statutory framework from ERISA, Glass-
Steagall and Regulation 9 and the factual setting involving the Comptroller's
ruling on Citibank's proposed collective investment trusts for IRAs, 69 the
Conover II court, like the Conover I court, noted that courts should accord
substantial deference to reasonable constructions of Glass-Steagall statutory
164. Id. at 856. In Conover , the Northern District of California district court concluded
that the pressure to sell the bank's IRA trust fund over other competing alternatives may lead
a bank to advise a customer to invest in the fund for reasons other than the strong performance
or solid features of the fund. Id. According to the court, a bank with promotional sales
pressure, therefore, may not give the impartial advice that a trustee should. Id.
165. Id. at 857, 857 n.12. The Conover I court observed that the Comptroller's opinion
on collective investment trusts for IRA's did not present the alternative argument that even if
IRA collective trusts violate Glass-Steagall, ERISA expressly authorized the funds. Id. The
court concluded that courts pay little deference to post hoc rationalizations by counsel that the
agency did not include in the original opinion. Id. at 857 n.12. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct. 2979, 2983 (1984) (Becker) (counsel's post
hoc rationalizations entitled to little deference by courts).
166. Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 857-58. In Conover , the court noted that a House
Conference Report of ERISA stated that ERISA did not limit the application of the securities
laws or other law relating to collective investment funds to banks maintaining such investment
funds. Id. at 858. See H. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5117 (text of ERISA House Conference Report).
167. Conover , 593 F. Supp. at 858. The Conover I court stated that banks can establish
collective investment trusts for IRAs and publicize the fund's existence, but the funds promoted
by Wells Fargo and BankCal advertised the fund as an investment in competition with mutual
funds and, therefore, did not meet the fiduciary requirement to qualify under Glass-Steagall.
Id.
168. See Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1501; see also infra notes 174-75 and accompanying
text (Conover II court concluded that Conover I court was in error).
169. Conover I, 596 F. Supp. at 1498-1500. The Conover II court set out the rules and
regulations of Glass-Steagall, ERISA and Regulation 9 of the Comptroller to form a basis of
inquiry for the controversy. Id. at 1498; see 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 378 (1982) (Glass-Steagall
separation of investment and commercial banking); I.R.C. §§ 219, 408 (1982) (ERISA regulation
of individual retirement accounts); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985) (Comptroller's regulations for
collective investment funds). The Conover II court also discussed the Comptroller's reasoning
in ruling that Citibank's CIT was valid. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1498-1500; see supra notes
119-40 and accompanying text (discussion of Comptroller's ruling approving Citibank's CIT).
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language and intent by the Comptroller.' 70 The Conover II court accepted as
reasonable the Comptroller's determination that Citibank's CIT was not a
Glass-Steagall security.' 7 ' The Conover II court defended the Comptroller's
determination by noting that the mere fact that Citibank registered CIT
under the securities acts was not an admission that the fund was a security
because the securities laws are only indicia of the meaning of security under
Glass-Steagall. '7 According to the Conover II court, the most important
inquiry was the distinction enunciated in Camp of determining whether the
fund serves an investment or true fiduciary purpose.' 73 The court stated that
Glass-Steagall does not prevent a bank from operating a fund for a true
fiduciary purpose. 7 4 In the fiduciary context, the Conover 11 court examined
the Conover I decision and concluded that Conover I was in error because
Conover I failed to recognize that both Glass-Steagall and ERISA expressly
permit collective investment trusts. 7-' The District of Columbia district court
170. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1500. In Conover II, the District of Columbia district
court noted that the Comptroller administers the Glass-Steagall Act and, therefore, a court
should accord great deference to any reasonable construction of the Act by the Comptroller.
Id. The court found that the Comptroller's ruling was reasonable and deserved substantial
deference. Id. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S.
Ct. 3003, 3009 (1984) (Schwab) (reasonable construction of statutory language by Board entitled
to great weight); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S.
Ct. 2979, 2983 (1984) (Becker) (reasonable construction of statutory language consistent with
legislative intent should receive substantial deference from courts); Investment Co. Inst. v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971) (principle of substantial deference has particular application
to Comptroller over Glass-Steagall); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 (1963) (administrative
agency entitled to deference on reasonable construction of statutory language); Investment Co.
Inst. v. Conover, 593 F. Supp. 846, 850 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Conover I) (courts grant substantial
deference to reasonable and consistent interpretation of Glass-Steagall by Comptroller); supra
note 150 and accompanying text (discussion of substantial deference in Conover I).
171. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1500-01; see infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text
(discussion of Glass-Steagall securities and Comptroller's conclusion that IRA trust funds are
not securities).
172. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1501. The Conover II court stated that although the
language of the securities laws is broad enough to include interests in common trust funds, the
Camp fiduciary requirement allows a bank to operate a common trust fund for a bona fide
fiduciary purpose. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1982) (common trust fund included in securities
laws); infra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (Citibank CIT serves proper fiduciary function).
173. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1501. The district court in Conover I, interpreted Camp
as exempting funds held for a true fiduciary purpose from Glass-Steagall. Id.; see Investment
Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 638 (1971) (Glass-Steagall hazards not present when bank
operates common trust fund for true fiduciary purpose).
174. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1501.
175. Id. The District of Columbia district court, in Conover II, concluded that the Conover
I court's emphasis on whether the fund fit the common trust fund mold was misplaced. Id.
The Conover II court stated that the Conover I court failed to consider that, under ERISA and
Regulation 9 of the Comptroller, the statutory tax exempt retirement plan represented by
Citibank CIT is a traditional banking service. Id.; see I.R.C. § 408(a)(5)(1982) (ERISA allows
collective investment funds for IRAs); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985) (Comptroller's strict regulations
on collective investment funds).
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in Conover II reasoned that ERISA's strict limitations on the bank as trustee
and on the participants in the IRA trust created a proper fiduciary purpose
and, therefore, was valid under the Glass-Steagall Act.'
76
In addition to the Conover II court's statutory determination that
Citibank's CIT was not a security under Glass-Steagall's literal language, the
Conover II court concluded that hazards which Congress intended Glass-
Steagall to prevent were not present in Citibank's CIT.'7 7 The District of
Columbia district court noted that no danger of unsound loans to the trust
existed because the bank could not lend to the trust. 78 Likewise, the court
noted that the Comptroller's regulations prohibit a bank from lending money
to participants in the trust based on their participation, so the danger of
improvident promotional loans to fund participants was not present in the
CIT proposal.'7 9 The Conover II court also concluded that the diverse nature
of the fund alleviated any fear of unsound loans to issuers of securities held
by the fund because any loan to one of the many issuers would have only a
minimal effect on the fund.'8 0 The District of Columbia district court also
dismissed the fear that the bank's reputation might act to camouflage the
inherent risk of the securities market because the safeguards built into ERISA
protect an IRA participant in a way that an ordinary investor could never
be protected.' 8' Finally, the Conover II court held that the Glass-Steagall
promotional hazards are nonexistent because the IRA participant chooses
the type of IRA that he wishes to utilize and the bank acts only as trustee
which is a function no different from customary fiduciary functions.' 2 The
Conover II court concluded by observing that neither Glass-Steagall nor
ERISA prohibits a bank from advertising IRA trust services.' 3 In fact, the
176. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1501. The Conover II court stated that ERISA expressly
allows commingling of IRA trust assets. Id.; see I.R.C. § 408(a)(5) (1982) (bank may commingle
IRA trust assets in common trust fund or collective investment fund). ERISA also provides
reporting requirements for banks. I.R.C. § 408(i) (1982). ERISA constrains the participant in
an IRA to a $2000 maximum tax-deductible annual contribution. Id. §§ 408(a), (d). In addition,
ERISA provides a substantial penalty for withdrawal of funds before the participant reaches
the age of 59 1/2. Id. § 408(f).
177. Conover 1I, 596 F. Supp. at 1502-03; see infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text
(discussion of Glass-Steagall hazards in Conover II).
178. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1503; see 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(8)(i) (1985) (bank cannot
lend to collective investment trust).
179. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1503; see I.R.C. § 408(a)(4) (1982) (units of participation
in collective investment trust nontransferable so such units cannot be security for loan); 12
C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(8)(i) (1985) (bank cannot lend to commingled fund participant using unit of
participation as collateral).
180. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1503.
181. Id.
182. Id. The Conover II court stated that the bank sells IRA trustee services, not the
particular collective investment trust. Id. According to the court, the service is no different than
traditional fiduciary trust services. Id.
183. Id. at 1503-04. The Conover 11 court noted that advertising of a bank's services is
permissible. Id.; see Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1953) (banks may
advertise services). The court observed that Citibank is not advertising the CIT itself, rather the
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court observed that an absence of advertising would frustrate Congress'
intent to encourage retirement savings through IRA., 4 The Conover II court,
therefore, held that Citibank's collective investment trust for IRAs was valid
under Glass-Steagall.18
5
The district court opinions in Conover I and Conover II, interpreted in
light of the Supreme Court decisions in Camp and Becker and the statutory
background of Glass-Steagall and ERISA, reveal that the ultimate question
concerning the validity of collective investment trusts for IRAs is whether
the bank operates the fund for a fiduciary or investment purpose.8 6 A bank
is a fiduciary when the bank acts primarily for the benefit of the customer
in all matters connected with an undertaking, particularly in the capacity of
trustee, executor or administrator. 87 The United States Supreme Court in
Camp, the Northern District of California district court in Conover I and
the District of Columbia district court in Conover II all agreed that Glass-
Steagall does not prevent a bank from offering a collective investment trust
for a proper fiduciary purpose. 88 The Conover I and Conover II courts
differ, however, on what constitutes a bona fide fiduciary purpose.'89 The
major line of distinction between the two districts is in their perception of
the role that marketing or advertising plays in determining the existence of
the necessary fiduciary purpose.'90
bank is advertising the entire bank IRA trust service. Conover 11, 596 F. Supp. at 1504. The
court concluded that Citibank's use of the CIT in advertising solely sought customers to utilize
Citibank as IRA trustee and was valid under ERISA and Glass-Steagall. Id.
184. Conover HI, 596 F. Supp. at 1504; see supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text
(discussion of Conover I court's reasoning for concluding that Citibank's CIT was valid under
Glass-Steagall).
185. Conover HI, 596 F. Supp. at 1504.
186. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 638 (1971) (collective trusts for
proper fiduciary service subject to Glass-Steagall hazards); Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1501,
1502, 1504 (collective investment trust for true fiduciary purpose valid under Glass-Steagall);
Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 858 (court held that banks can establish collective investment trusts
for IRA's validity, but bank cannot promote trust as investment); see also I.R.C. § 408(a)(5)
(1982) (bank can commingle IRA trust assets in collective investment fund); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18
(1985) (collective investment trusts valid under Comptroller's regulation); supra notes 156-61,
173-76 (discussion of fiduciary purpose in Conover I and Conover II).
187. 12 C.F.R. § 9.1(b) (1985) (definition of fiduciary in Comptroller's regulations for
collective investments).
188. See supra notes 65-66, 156-61, 173-76 (discussion of fiduciary purpose in Camp,
Conover I and Conover II).
189. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 596 F. Supp. 1501-04, (D.D.C. 1984) (Conover
II) (IRA collective investment trust is traditional bank trust service governed by ERISA and
valid fiduciary service under Glass-Steagall); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 593 F. Supp.
846, 853-58 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Conover I) (advertising and promoting IRA trust in competition
with mutual fund serves investment rather than fiduciary service).
190. See Conover I, 596 F. Supp. at 1503-04 (bank validly can advertise products and still
comply with Glass-Steagall); Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 854-56, 858 (advertising of collective
investment trust to compete with mutual fund is not traditional fiduciary function); see also
infra notes 191-219 (discussion of proper fiduciary purpose and collective investment trusts).
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In examining the fiduciary purpose of an IRA collective investment trust,
the Conover I court held that advertising and promoting the trust fund as
an investment in a direct competition with mutual funds violates Glass-
Steagall because the basic purpose of the fund then would be investment
oriented rather than fiduciary in nature.' 9' In contrast, the Conover II court
stated that collective investment trusts for IRAs are not securities under
Glass-Steagall and, therefore, bank advertising of the service does not
matter.' 92 Section 9.18(b)(5)(v) of the Comptroller' regulations on collective
investment states that a bank cannot advertise collective investment funds
described in section 9.18(a)(1) except to advertise the availability of a report
on the funds in connection with the promotion of fiduciary services of the
bank. 93 Section 9.18(a)(1), of the Comptroller's regulation allows collective
investment funds with a bank as trustee or executor, but IRAs also qualify
under section 9.18(a)(2), which allows collective investment of funds held
for retirement, pension, profit sharing and stock bonus plans and which are
exempt from Federal income taxation. 94 The advertising prohibition listed
in section 9.18(b)(5)(v), therefore, does not apply to section 9.18(a)(2).195
Because IRA collective investment trusts qualify under section 9.18(a)(2) as
retirement funds, the question arises whether advertising and promotion play
an important role in determining fiduciary purpose. 96
191. Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 855-56, 858. The Conover I court stated that banks
properly could promote pre-existing commingled funds for IRAs, but that seeking to attract
new investors by promoting revocable IRAs in direct competition with mutual funds is an
investment purpose, not a fiduciary purpose. Id. at 856. According to the court, the Wells
Fargo and BankCal brochures on IRAs expressly compared IRA stock funds to mutual funds.
Id. at 856.
192. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1503-04. The Conover II court stated that IRA collective
investment trusts are not securities under Glass-Steagall regardless of being mass-marketed. Id.
The court added that neither ERISA nor any other statute prohibits marketing of IRA trust
services. Id. at 1504.
193. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(5)(v) (1985). Section 9.18(b)(5)(v) of Regulation 9 of the Comp-
troller provides that a bank may not advertise as public a collective investment trust except as
otherwise provided in Rule 9. Id. Section 9.18(b)(5)(iv) allows banks to advertise the existence
of a report on the fund in connection with promotion of the bank's fiduciary services. Id. §
9.18(b)(5)(iv). Section 9.18(b)(5)(v) only applies to § 9.18(a)(1) collective investment funds,
which are funds exclusively for investment of money contributed therein by bank as trustee. Id.
§ 9.18(a)(1), (b)(5)(v). See DiLoRtENzo, supra note 5, at § 96.07[4] (bank may not advertise
common trust fund except to mention report on fund and to compare past performances to
general market indicators).
194. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(1), (a)(2) (1985). Section 9.18(aX2) provides that a collective
investment can be in a fund consisting solely of retirement plans and similar programs that are
exempt from federal income taxation. Id. § 9.18(a)(1). Section 408 of the Internal Revenue
Code provides that IRA accounts are exempt from taxation. I.R.C. § 408(e) (1982). The Conover
II court contended that IRA funds, therefore, are tax exempt retirement assets under § 9.18(a)(2)
of the Comptroller's regulations. Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1504.
195. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(5)(v) (1985).
196. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a)(2) (1985) (Comptroller allows collective investment of funds held
for retirement plans, profit sharing plans and other tax exempt programs); see also I.R.C. §
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The Conover I court's determination that advertising and marketing are
crucial in examining fiduciary purpose finds some support from the Supreme
Court in Becker in which the court stated that the role of the bank in the
transaction is important. 97 The Becker Court noted that when a bank puts
itself into competition with securities dealers, it moves into a field that
cannot be mixed prudently with the business of commercial banking.'9s The
Conover I court thus contended that advertising IRAs in competition with
mutual funds promotes an investment rather than a fiduciary purpose. 99 The
Conover I analysis could go too far, however, and become the functional
analysis that the Becker Court rejected. 200 Arguing that advertising alone is
sufficient to make an IRA collective trust appear more like an investment
than a fiduciary service may focus too much attention on the function of
the service and not enough on the nature of the instrument and the bank's
role as trustee in administering the IRAs. 20 1 Even the Federal Reserve Bulletins
that the Conover II court cited allow a bank to publicize the existence,
purpose and use of a trust fund.20 2 The advertising should promote the use
408(e) (1982) (IRAs are tax exempt); Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1504 (Citibank's CIT qualifies
under § 9.18(a)(2)).
197. See Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 854-56, 858 (promotion and advertising are components
of fiduciary purpose examination for Glass-Steagall); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors of Fed. Reserves Sys., 104 S. Ct. 2979, 2989 (1984) (Becker) (bank's role in transaction
or service is important consideration in addition to nature of service). The Becker Court rejected
the functional analysis of looking at a service to determine whether the service functions more
like an investment or financial service in favor of an examination of the role the bank plays in
offering the service and the nature of the service. Id.; see infra note 199 and accompanying text
(Conover II court contended that excessive advertising of IRA collective investment trusts reveals
bank's investment role).
198. Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2989. The Becker Court concluded that a bank's direct
competition with securities firms creates promotional pressures that adversely may affect the
bank's commercial banking activities because the bank will have a pecuniary interest in marketing
its services over the securities firm's service. Id. at 2989-90.
199. Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 854-56, 858; see supra notes 158-61 and accompanying
text (discussion of investment purpose of IRA collective investment trusts in Conover I).
200. See Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2982, 2989. The functional analysis outlined in Becker
provided that the determination whether a banking service was valid under Glass-Steagall
balanced on whether the service is more functionally similar to a traditional banking operation
or an investment transaction. Id. at 2982. The Becker Court rejected the functional analysis
and concentrated on the role of the bank in the transaction along with the nature of the
instrument. Id. at 2989; see also Ianni, supra note 2, at 119-20 (discussion of functional analysis
in Becker district court).
201. See Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2989 (rejection of functional analysis); see also I.R.C. § 408
(1982) (bank acts as trustee on IRA retirement trust); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985) (Comptroller's
stringent fiduciary regulations on collective investments); supra notes 100-12 and accompanying
text (discussion of features and nature of IRAs and bank's role in administering IRAs).
202. See 42 Fed. Res. Bull. 228 (1956) (advertising of common trust fund should make
clear that fund is for investment of funds held for true fiduciary purpose); 41 Fed. Res. Bull.
142 (1955) (advertising of common trust fund should be confined to describing existence,
purpose and use of such fund). The Federal Reserve Bulletins emphasize that the trust fund
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of the bank as trustee and not promote the fund as an independent investment
opportunity.2 3 Bank IRA trust funds are long-term retirement trusts for
participants. 204 Congress established IRAs to encourage retirement savings,
and advertising IRAs is consistent with Congress' goal of increasing retire-
ment savings because advertising alerts potential customers to alternatives
for retirement savings. 20 5 The Conover I court's advertising restrictions would
be very difficult to administer because all advertisements by banks would
necessitate careful scrutiny to avoid Glass-Steagall problems.206 If a bank
establishes an IRA collective investment trust, however, and only advertises
the IRA service including the existence of a collective trust fund along with
the purpose and use of such fund, both the Conover I and Conover 11
decisions would validate the fund under Glass-Steagall.
207
In addition to the advertising aspects of commingled IRA trusts, the
Glass-Steagall hazards enunciated in Camp are absent for IRA trusts.
20 1
ERISA and Regulation 9 expressly prohibit loans to the trust or to trust
participants secured by units of participation in the trust.2 9 A bank opting
should not be advertised as an investment in and of itself, but instead to demonstrate the
desirability of the bank's fiduciary services. Id.
203. 41 Fed. Res. Bull. 142 (1955); see supra note 202 (discussion of Federal Reserve
bulletins on common trust fuds).
204. See I.R.C. § 408 (1982) (IRA accounts are defined as trust accounts from which
individual may not withdraw until individual reaches age of 59 1/2 or individual must pay 1001o
withdrawal penalty); McGuIRE, supra note 102, at 1-7 (IRA accounts are for long term retirement
planning).
205. See McGUIRE, supra note 102, at 7-8, 116 (purpose of IRA is to encourage retirement
savings and advertising should reflect this purpose); S. YOUNG, supra note 103, at 6A.01
(Congress created IRAs to encourage individuals not covered under employer retirement plans
to participate in private retirement plans); see also I.R.C. § 408 (1982) (no express prohibitions
against advertising of IRAs); compare Conover 11, 596 F. Supp. at 1504 (prohibiting advertising
of IRAs could frustrate ERISA's goal of encouraging retirement savings) with Conover I, 593
F. Supp. at 858 (advertising of IRAs as in competition with securities would violate Glass-
Steagall).
206. See Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 858 (Conover I advertising requirements). The Conover
I court stated that a bank may establish collective investment trusts for IRAs and advertise the
trust's existence, but the bank may not advertise the trust as an investment opportunity in
competition with securities. Id.
207. See Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1504 (bank may establish and advertise IRA collective
investment trust validly); Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 858 (bank may establish IRA collective
investment trust and only advertise fiduciary function of fund); see also I.R.C. § 408 (1982)
(no prohibitions against advertising IRAs); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985) (no advertising prohibition
on commingled retirement trusts); 41 Fed. Res. Bull. 142 (1955) (bank can advertise fiduciary
purpose of common trust fund).
208. See Camp, 401 U.S. at 629-34 (discussion of Glass-Steagall hazards); infra note 209
and accompanying text (Glass-Steagall hazards absent for IRA collective investment trust);
supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussion of Glass-Steagall hazards as enunciated in
Camp); supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text (discussion in Conover I of absence of
Glass-Steagall hazards).
209. See I.R.C. § 408(a)(4) (1982) (participation in fund nonforfeitable so interest in fund
cannot be security for loan); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(8)(i) (1985) (bank may not lend to fund or
participant in fund based on units of participation in fund).
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to offer collective investment trusts for IRAs probably will administer the
assets in the trust department consistently with other traditional trust serv-
ices.210 With a bank acting as trustee for the IRA collective investment trusts
and the funds being commingled for a traditional retirement function, the
collective investment of IRA trust assets thus appears to be a valid exercises
of banking trust powers.21' Since traditional bank trust services are permitted
under Glass-Steagall, then the IRA trust service also appears to be valid
under Glass-Steagall.
21 2
In examining fiduciary purpose, ERISA and Regulation 9 of the Comp-
troller also play an important role. 213 The Conover II court argued that
ERISA's explicit authorization of commingled trust funds for IRAs and the
Comptroller's regulations on collective trusts provide the proper fiduciary
controls. 2 4 The Conover I court contended that the Supreme Court, in
Becker, rejected a regulatory approach to Glass-Steagall and that a court
should examine only the Glass-Steagall Act. 2ts The Conover I court's reliance
on the Becker Court's rejection of a regulatory approach is not entirely
proper, however, because the Becker court only rejected administrative
regulation where the Comptroller merely established guidelines on a service,
whereas Congress expressly mandated rules on IRAs in ERISA, and the
Comptroller codified rules in Regulation 9.2 16 Congress' actual authorization
of common trust funds for IRAs is not the prohibited administrative regu-
210. See McGurRE, supra note 102, at 82-83 (trust department has long history of dealing
with retirement plans and can administer IRAs ably); see also DILORENZO, supra note 5, at §
96.07[11-[3] (common trust fund is trust activity). The trust activities of national banks do not
violate Glass-Steagall because trust investment activities with trust funds are conducted on
behalf of customers and, therefore, permitted by the Act. Id. § 96.07[2]; see S. REP. No. 77,
supra note 2, at 16 (both before passage of Glass-Steagall and after Glass-Steagall banks may
purchase and sell investments on behalf of customers); Conover 11, 596 F. Supp. at 1501 (IRA
trusts are natural extension of traditional banking actions).
211. See I.R.C. § 408(a) (1982) (individual retirement account administered by bank as
trustee).
212. See DiLoitaNzo, supra note 5, at § 96.07[2] (traditional trust services permitted under
Glass-Steagall).
213. See I.R.C. § 408 (1982) (Congress' regulations of IRAs by ERISA); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18
(1985) (Comptroller's regulations for collective investment).
214. Conover I1, 596 F. Supp. at 1501-04; 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985); see supra notes 175-76
and accompanying text (Conover 11 court's discussion of ERISA and Regulation 9 of the
Comptroller).
215. Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 854. The Conover I court stated that the Supreme Court,
in Becker, rejected the regulatory approach of looking to other statutes to fill Glass-Steagall
gaps. Id.; see Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 104 S. Ct.
2979, 2988 (1984) (Becker) (Supreme Court rejected administrative regulatory approach); infra
notes 216-19 and accompanying text (discussion of regulatory approach).
216. See Becker, 104 S. Ct. at 2988. The Becker Court rejected the argument that mere
administrative guidelines by the Comptroller replace the need for Glass-Steagall. Id. The
additional regulations for IRA collective investment trusts, however, include express authori-
zation by Congress in ERISA and codified regulations by the Comptroller in Regulation 9. See
I.R.C. § 408 (1982) (ERISA regulations on IRAs); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985) (Comptroller's
regulations for collective investments).
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latory approach enunciated by the Becker Court.217 The existence of Congres-
sional approval of IRA collective investment trusts, therefore, adds weight
to the arguments for allowing banks to offer the IRA service. 2 8 While the
courts analyze services under the securities laws somewhat differently than
under Glass-Steagall, 2 9 the Supreme Court, in examining the applicability of
securities laws to a pension plan, referred to Congress' passage of ERISA as
an additional regulatory scheme to examine. 220 The Supreme Court stated
that ERISA undercuts arguments for extending the Securities Acts to the
pension plan in question because Congress believed that it was filling a
regulatory void by enacting ERISA.221 ERISA covered topics not expressly
covered by the security law. By analogy, the existence of ERISA also fills a
regulatory void with IRAs and Glass-Steagall, thus allowing collective in-
vestment trusts for IRAs.
Both the District of Columbia and the Northern District of California
agree that collectively-invested IRA trusts are valid services under Glass-
Steagall as long as the banks perform those services for proper fiduciary
purposes. 222 The districts differ, however, on whether promotional advertising
of IRAs defeats the fiduciary purpose and creates an improper investment
motive for IRA trusts. 223 The existence of a specific provision governing
IRAs enunciated by Congress in ERISA, and the Comptroller's regulations
217. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (Congress' promulgation of ERISA is
more substantial than mere administrative guidelines issued by Comptroller as discussed in
Becker).
218. See I.R.C. § 408 (1982) (Congress' ERISA regulations for IRAs); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18
(1985) (Comptroller's regulations for collective investment trusts).
219. See lanni, supra note 2, at 121-37 (discussion of analysis of security under federal
securities laws). The Supreme Court in analyzing a security under the securities laws examines
both the literal statutory language of the securities acts and the existence of other regulatory
statutes to perform the functions of the securities laws. Id.
220. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 1569-70 (1979) (existence
of ERISA covering pension plans undercuts arguments that securities laws should apply to
noncontributory, compulsory pension plans).
221. Id. at 569-70. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, a union formed
a pension plan which required all members to belong and to which employees did not contribute.
Id. at 553. An employee sued the union for securities misrepresentation because the union
denied the employee retirement benefits due to a break in the employee's service. Id. at 555.
The Court ruled that the pension fund was not a security under the securities laws because the
fund did not meet the definition of security under the acts and because the legislative history
of the acts revealed that Congress did not intend to include pension plans under the securities
laws. Id. at 559-64. The Daniel opinion also contained dictum stating that the passage of ERISA
by Congress filled a regulatory void and eliminated the need for protection of the securities
laws for pension funds. Id. at 569-70.
222. See Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1504 (IRA collective investment fund valid under
Glass-Steagall); Conover I, 593 F. Supp. at 858 (collective investment funds for IRAs are valid
if funds possess proper fiduciary purpose).
223. See Conover II, 596 F. Supp. at 1504 (advertising of IRA consistent with congressional
purpose); Conover 1, 593 F. Supp. at 858 (advertising of IRAs promotes investment function
rather than proper fiduciary purpose); see supra notes 186-207 and accompanying text (discussion
of proper fiduciary purpose).
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for collective investment trusts add support to allowing banks to offer IRA
collective investment trusts. 224 A bank desiring to offer such collective trusts
today could qualify, therefore, under both the Conover I and Conover II
decisions if the bank does no more than advertise the existence, purpose and
use of the trust fund in conjunction with the bank's services as trustee.
225 If
the bank utilizes such controlled advertising, the IRA collective investment
trust would be valid under Glass-Steagall because the IRA is authorized by
ERISA and the Comptroller's regulations and does not violate the hazards
which Congress enacted Glass-Steagall to prevent. 22
STOKELY G. CALDWELL, JR.
224. See I.R.C. § 408 (1982) (Congress' ERISA rules for IRAs); 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1985)
(Comptroller's regulations for collective investments); supra notes 212-21 and accompanying
text (discussion of regulatory approach of examining ERISA in conjunction with Glass-Steagall).
225. See supra notes 186-221 and accompanying text (discussion of utilization of collective
investment trusts for IRAs by banks in Conover I and Conover II.
226. See supra notes 186-221 and accompanying text (IRA collective investment trust
authorized by ERISA and Comptroller).
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